India prepares to navigate rising Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean
NEW DELHI : A silent yet powerful wave is rising in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), distinct from the one that struck two decades ago. This surge, driven by China, is marked by its strategic maneuvers in trade, energy dependencies, rapid construction of dual-use maritime ports, extensive surveillance operations, a flood of arms sales, and assertive power projection.
In 2012, the 18th Communist Party Congress of China adopted a resolution to “build a strong maritime nation,” marking the beginning of an expansive maritime strategy. Since then, China’s maritime presence has grown significantly, encompassing trade, energy imports and exploration, fisheries, marine transportation, shipbuilding, naval expansion, and the establishment of overseas bases. Simultaneously, China is working to bolster its maritime power and reshape the global maritime order. Conceptually, despite not being an Indian Ocean Region (IOR) state, China has introduced the “China-Indian Ocean Region” initiative, aiming to establish a “maritime community with a shared future.
China is building at a cost of $29 billion three railway lines to Thailand, Cambodia and Laos, eventually connecting to Laem Chabang Port in the Gulf of Thailand. Thailand and China are also planning a “land bridge” to connect the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand.
China conducted surveillance missions and cyber warfare in the IOR, expanded naval arms exports to Myanmar, Bangladesh and Pakistan, besides signing military aid agreement with Maldives, in March 2024. However, in September 2019, India expelled the Chinese research vessel Shi Yan 1 after it was found operating without permission in India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI).
China’s navy is now the world’s largest at 370 vessels, aspiring to grow to 435 by 2030. India, in contrast, aspires to acquire 175 ships by 2035 from the current 132. China has sent 46 naval contingents to the Indian Ocean since 2008, some of which conducted amphibious operations and air defence exercises that are not relevant for counter-piracy operations in the Somali coast, thus violating its UN Security Council commitments.
At any given time, China has eight to ten warships deployed in IOR, apart from research or spy vessels and many illegal fishing vessels. It despatches a submarine every month and in 2020, executed the use of unmanned underwater drones to map the ocean floor around the ANI. With three aircraft carriers, with a plan to have 11 in all, China is poised to send carrier task force patrols to the IOR by 2025.
It is estimated that China gets more than 80 million tonnes of fish in the Indo-Pacific through illegal fishing that violates Article 56 of the international maritime laws under the UNCLOS. Illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing has become a major problem. It is in this context that the Quad launched in 2022 Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness to combat IUU fishing and monitor “dark shipping”. In July this year, the Quad foreign ministers meeting at Tokyo decided to take concrete measures in this regard.
To protect its maritime interests, India initiated its first joint integrated command, the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) in 2001. It protects 600,000 sq km of EEZ in the region that is about 30% of India’s 2 million sq km. Yet, the security situation is becoming complicated with China’s naval forays. China’s leader Mao Zedong once observed: “whatever the enemy has, we should have”. The ANC should deploy the most modern equipment and skills to safeguard not only India’s national interests but also the “preferred partners” in the region.
India must adopt a robust and comprehensive strategy to safeguard its maritime interests, particularly around the critical Ten Degree Channel. This involves accelerating the Act East Policy by leveraging the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a strategic springboard, developing world-class infrastructure, such as a transshipment facility at Great Nicobar, and enhancing connectivity with Sabang Port in Indonesia.
To bolster maritime security and deterrence, India should focus on deploying advanced unmanned underwater drones and long-endurance submarines. Strengthening partnerships with Southeast Asian nations is also essential, including initiatives to assist in capacity building and undertake joint surveillance, search, and rescue operations. Furthermore, India must enhance its conventional and strategic capabilities at the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) to solidify its position as a key player in the region.