By Mr. Priyatham Sanjeeva Reddy Ramidi
Maritime emergencies rarely begin as dramatic events. A vessel loses propulsion. A machinery-space fire appears. A ship begins to list. An unidentified sheen forms astern. By the time the situation is clearly an emergency, the window for preventing a larger casualty may already be closing.
That is why two recent procurement moves by the Indian Coast Guard deserve attention beyond the usual discussion of fleet expansion.
In July 2026, the Coast Guard issued requests for information for five Multi-Purpose Emergency Response Vessels and, only days later, for Medium Altitude Long Endurance remotely piloted aircraft. Viewed separately, these are acquisition programs. Viewed together, they suggest something more consequential: a shift toward an emergency-response model built around persistent detection, earlier assessment and faster intervention.
The important question is not simply what new platforms India is buying. It is what those platforms could allow the Coast Guard to do before a casualty becomes irreversible.
For decades, maritime emergency response has been constrained by distance. Casualties often develop far from shore, and the first reliable picture may come from the vessel itself. Yet the ship in distress may simultaneously be fighting fire, flooding, machinery failure, or injury while trying to communicate an accurate picture ashore.
Long-endurance remotely piloted aircraft can alter that equation. Their value is not merely range, but persistence.
A conventional aircraft can reach a casualty quickly, but it cannot remain overhead indefinitely. A long-endurance unmanned platform can potentially maintain surveillance, follow a vessel, observe changes in trim or smoke, identify nearby traffic, relay imagery, and allow shore authorities to build a continuous operational picture. In search and rescue, that persistence can narrow uncertainty over large areas. In pollution response, it can track the movement and extent of a spill rather than relying only on intermittent reports.
The Coast Guard’s wider modernization makes this particularly significant. India contracted for eight additional Dornier 228 aircraft in February 2026, while the Coast Guard in July announced the induction of its first indigenous pollution-control vessel, Samudra Pratap. The proposed remotely piloted aircraft and emergency-response vessels therefore form part of a broader effort to strengthen both awareness and physical response.
That combination matters. Detection without intervention creates information. Intervention without timely detection creates delay. An effective casualty-response system requires both.
Consider a disabled merchant vessel drifting toward a sensitive coastline. The initial report may indicate only machinery failure. Hours later, the vessel could be taking water, dragging anchor or approaching shoal water. Persistent aerial surveillance could provide independent information on position, drift, surrounding traffic and visible condition while an emergency-response vessel proceeds toward the scene.
The measure of success may be that the dramatic rescue never becomes necessary.
Traditionally, casualty response is event-driven: a distress call is received, assets are tasked, responders arrive, and the situation is managed. Persistent surveillance creates the possibility of something closer to condition-driven response, where authorities follow an evolving risk and escalate intervention as indicators deteriorate.
That is particularly relevant in Indian waters. The Coast Guard’s responsibilities include maritime safety and security, search and rescue, law enforcement, emergency assistance and protection of the marine environment across a vast maritime domain. As shipping density, offshore activity and coastal economic exposure increase, the cost of late information increases with them.
There is also an investigative dimension that deserves more attention.
The earliest hours of a casualty often contain the most valuable evidence. Investigators later reconstruct timelines from voyage data recorders, AIS tracks, engine-room records, communications, photographs and witness accounts. Yet a vessel’s condition can change significantly between the first failure and the arrival of investigators.
Persistent aerial observation could create an independent, time-stamped record of a developing casualty: when smoke increased, when a list became visible, when survival craft were prepared, when pollution first appeared, how the vessel drifted, and what assistance arrived in what sequence.
That would not replace formal casualty investigation, nor should surveillance imagery automatically be treated as proof of fault. But it could preserve facts that might otherwise disappear.
The same evidence can become important in P&I and marine claims.
After a major casualty, disputes frequently concern timing. When did the owner know the situation was deteriorating? When was assistance requested? Was salvage engaged early enough? When did pollution begin? Were reasonable steps taken to prevent escalation? Could earlier intervention have reduced the eventual loss?
For insurers, shipowners and cargo interests, the difference between a manageable machinery casualty and a grounding, wreck-removal operation or pollution event can be measured in millions of dollars. Earlier information does not eliminate liability, but it can influence decisions while there is still an opportunity to reduce it.
It could also improve decisions made by P&I correspondents, salvors and authorities during the casualty itself. Independent surveillance may help establish whether a vessel remains stable, whether pollution is visible, whether towage is becoming urgent or whether evacuation must take priority over property preservation.
Technology, however, has limits.
More surveillance does not automatically produce better decisions. A Coast Guard can receive enormous volumes of imagery, sensor data and vessel information and still face the same fundamental challenge: deciding what matters. The effectiveness of remotely piloted aircraft will depend on trained operators, resilient communications, data integration, clear escalation criteria and coordination among aircraft, ships, rescue centers, ports and other agencies.
The emergency-response vessels face a similar test. Their value will not be measured by specifications alone, but by where they are based, how rapidly they can deploy and how effectively they integrate with existing assets.
There is also a danger in allowing technology to create false confidence. Sensors may identify that something is wrong, but casualty management remains an exercise in professional judgement. A photograph cannot always reveal progressive flooding. An AIS track cannot explain why machinery cannot be restarted. An unmanned aircraft can observe a vessel, but it cannot replace the judgement of the master, salvage team, rescue coordinator or technical experts trying to understand what is occurring inside it.
Technology should therefore shorten the distance between observation and professional judgement, not replace judgement itself.
That may ultimately be the most important aspect of India’s current modernization.
The future of maritime safety will not simply belong to the authority with the most ships, aircraft or sensors. It will belong to the authority that can connect detection, interpretation and intervention into one continuous response system.
India’s recent Coast Guard initiatives suggest an opportunity to do exactly that. If remotely piloted aircraft become persistent eyes over the maritime domain, and emergency-response vessels become part of the means of acting on what those eyes detect, the result could be more than additional capability.
It could represent a change in when maritime emergencies are confronted: not after the casualty has fully developed, but while there is still time to prevent it.
Disclaimer: The views expressed by Priyatham Ramidi in this interview are his independent professional opinions and are provided for general informational purposes. They do not constitute legal, insurance, classification, regulatory, security, or vessel-specific advice. Operational decisions are entirely based on the circumstances and of the individual vessels at their own discretion and made in conjunction with the Master’s agreement along with technical managers, flag administration, classification society, P&I Club or insurers, brokers, and relevant authorities.
